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A Modern Application of Section 304(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code: In Re Gercke
I. Introduction
One purpose of United States bankruptcy law is to ensure that
creditors receive an equal distribution of a debtor's assets.' When a
debtor files for bankruptcy under United States law, this purpose is
furthered by an automatic stay prohibiting creditors from pursuing
their claims independent of the bankruptcy proceeding. 2 'A problem
arises, however, when a multinational debtor with assets in the
United States commences a foreign bankruptcy proceeding; any
United States creditors of the debtor will want to attach the Ameri-
can assets in satisfaction of their claims, but the foreign representa-
tive of the bankruptcy estate will want control of the assets so that
they may become part of the bankruptcy estate to be distributed
among creditors in accordance with the law of the bankruptcy tribu-
nal. Because there is no automatic stay in effect with respect to these
assets, the foreign representative must 3 petition a United States
court for ancillary relief in the form of an injunction under section
304 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
4
When applying the criteria delineated in section 304(c) 5 to de-
termine whether to grant injunctive relief, a court must reconcile the
conflict between its interests in protecting domestic creditors and its
interest in promoting international comity. Traditionally protection-
ist, American courts have recently begun to stress comity as the de-
terminative factor in granting relief to foreign representatives under
section 304. While the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in In re Gercke6 followed this trend by emphasizing
comity as the significant factor in its grant of relief, the court gave
Huber, Creditor Equality in Transnational Bankruptcies: The United States Position, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 742 (1986).
2 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
3 There are other options available to the foreign representative: the use of state
law remedies and the commencement of a full bankruptcy proceeding under United States
law. Boshkoff, United States Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 36 Iwr'L & COMP.
L.Q. 729, 730 (1987).
4 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330) [hereinafter "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"].
5 For a discussion of the criteria listed in section 304, see infra note 44 and accompa-
nying text.
6 122 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D.C. 1991).
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more than perfunctory consideration to all relevant section 304 crite-
ria in striking a balance between protection of United States credi-
tors and recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
This Note examines the Gercke court's application of the section
304(c) criteria in light of the particular facts before the court, the
legislative intent behind the enactment of section 304, and prior ju-
dicial interpretations of section 304. The Note recognizes that
although judicial applications of the section have been inconsistent
at best, courts today are likely to grant relief to a foreign representa-
tive based principally, if not solely, upon the comity factor of section
304. This Note concludes that the Gercke decision represents a rea-
sonable retreat from the modem court's tendency to rely solely on
the comity considerations of section 304(c)(5) in deciding section
304 issues. With the exception of its determination of the choice of
forum clause issue, Gercke is a sound interpretation of section 304 of
the Bankruptcy Code.
II. The Facts of Gercke and the Court's Decision
In re Gercke involved an ancillary proceeding brought pursuant to
11 U.S.C. section 304 by the administrator of Dominion Interna-
tional Group, PIC ("Dominion"), a multinational corporation en-
gaged in insolvency proceedings in a United Kingdom Companies
Court under the United Kingdom's Insolvency Act of 1986.7 The
administrator sought to enjoin York Associates ("York"), an Ameri-
can creditor of Dominion, from pursuing its civil breach of contract
action against Dominion in the Superior Court of the District of Co-
lumbia.8 The contract between York and Dominion contained a
choice of forum clause providing for the exclusive jurisdiction and
venue of the District of Columbia courts.9 The Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Columbia granted an injunction against the continua-
tion of York's superior court action pending the Companies Court's
determination in the United Kingdom insolvency proceeding as to
when and where the superior court action should be litigated.' 0
However, the bankruptcy court refused to enjoin enforcement of the
superior court's discovery order for the production of various docu-
ments, therefore Dominion had to comply with discovery."
7 Id. at 622.
8 Id. The claim arose from a contract whereby Dominion agreed to purchase sub-
stantially all of York's assets for $45,000,000. Id. at 624.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 622.
11 Id. York's civil action was commenced in August 1989. Discovery began soon
thereafter. A stay in the proceeding was granted while Dominion negotiated with its credi-
tors. Unsuccessful in these negotiations, Dominion entered into U.K. insolvency proceed-
ings, and its subsequent motion to extend the stay was denied. In April 1990 York filed a
motion to compel production of documents. Dominion responded, and in a superior
court hearing, the motion to compel was granted. Id. at 624-25.
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The bankruptcy court first established that irreparable harm to
Dominion's estate must be shown before injunctive relief could be
granted.' 2 The court then found that, although litigation expenses
alone are insufficient to constitute irreparable harm, if the cost of
defending the action "threatens the assets of a bankrupt estate as
opposed to merely diminishing them," then the injunction would be
warranted.' 3 In this case, defense of the civil action was estimated to
cost $200,000 to $300,000.14 The high cost of litigation would re-
sult in the disruption of "an orderly determination of claims" and a
"fair distribution of assets," which would constitute harm to the es-
tate. 15 Furthermore, the court found that due to the Companies
Court's familiarity with Dominion's insolvency case, it was in a better
position than the superior court to make decisions about the case as
questions arose. 16 Thus, litigation in superior court would not be
the most cost effective.' 7
After finding irreparable harm sufficient to support an injunc-
tion against "full-blown" litigation, the court concluded that Domin-
ion would suffer little harm in complying with the superior court's
discovery order.' 8 Dominion's expenses would be insubstantial be-
cause the discovery request was narrow, and investigating the claim
early would be to the estate's advantage.' 9
Although section 304 does not specifically address the necessity
of irreparable harm, and Dominion did not argue that an injunction
would be appropriate absent irreparable harm, the court concluded
that its section 304 analysis would yield the same result even if irrep-
arable harm had not been a requirement. 20 Applying the section
304(c) criteria 2' to the facts, the Gercke court noted that the factor in
the preamble relating to "economic and expeditious administration
of [the] estate" was addressed sufficiently by the court's irreparable
harm analysis. 22 Based on that analysis, the expeditious and eco-
nomical administration of Dominion's estate under the United King-
dom insolvency proceeding warranted an injunction against further
litigation of York's claim in superior court.2 s
12 Id. at 626.
13 Id. Irreparable harm is clear if Dominion is forced to default on this $30 million
claim. Furthermore, if Dominion must spend every available fund to defend this claim,
then this also is irreparable harm sufficient to justify an injunction. Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 626-27.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 627-28.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 628-29.
21 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
22 Gercke, 122 Bankr. at 629. For a discussion of the court's irreparable harm analysis,
see supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
23 Gerche, 122 Bankr. at 629.
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The court then determined that enjoining superior court litiga-
tion was necessary to ensure the just treatment of claimholders of the
estate24 and to prevent preferential dispositions of the estate's prop-
erty.25 Under the United Kingdom Insolvency Act, York could peti-
tion the Companies Court to lift its stay so York could litigate
elsewhere. 26 Again, if Dominion had to default on York's claim be-
cause of expenses, the just treatment of claimholders would be
threatened if York were allowed to continue its litigation against Do-
minion. However, requiring Dominion to comply with discovery
would not be prejudicial to the goals of ensuring just treatment of
claimholders and preventing preferential dispositions of the estate's
property. 27
In considering the protection of York against prejudice and in-
convenience in processing its claim in the Companies Court, (section
304(c)(2)) the court addressed delay, cost, and the contract's forum
selection clause.28 The court found that denying York the benefit of
the forum selection clause would be prejudicial to York, but such
prejudice was simply an issue of cost.2 9 Since York could not show
that litigation in the Companies Court would be substantially
delayed and costly, prejudice to York alone did not justify denying
the injunction.30 On the other hand, enjoining the discovery order
would prejudice York's efforts to prepare for future litigation and
could result in York having to litigate the discovery issue again in
front of the Companies Court.3 '
Finally, the Gercke court addressed the comity criteria of section
304(c). 32 The court recognized the importance of comity to the or-
derly and systematic distribution of assets in an international bank-
ruptcy proceeding.33 In a lengthy discussion, the court concluded
that the choice of forum clause in the York-Dominion contract must
be subordinated to considerations of comity due to the intervening
24 Id.
25 Id. at 630. The court noted that continuing the superior court litigation would not
affect preferential transfers of estate property as contemplated by section 304(c). The
court addressed Dominion's argument that a default judgment would give York a larger
claim than it is entitled under its discussion of the just treatment of all claim-holders. Id.
26 Id. at 629. Section 11 (3)(d) of the Insolvency Act gives the Companies Court the
discretion to lift its stay. This is similar to the discretionary provision provided for the
United States courts in section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 629-30.
29 Id. at 630.
30 Id. at 629-30.
31 Id. at 630. Furthermore, sustaining the discovery order may help defray further
cost to York. Id.
32 Id. at 631. The fresh start criterion in section 304(c)(4) is inapplicable to a corpo-
rate debtor, and thus was irrelevant. Id. at 634. The court also ignored section 304(c)(4),
since the parties stipulated that the U.K. Insolvency Act is substantially in accord with the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 630-31.
33 Id. at 631.
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bankruptcy proceeding.34 The court found the arguments asserting
lack of reciprocity insufficient to justify denying comity.3 5 With re-
spect to the superior court's discovery order, however, the court
held that Dominion's delay in filing a section 304 petition until after
it litigated the issue in superior court and received an adverse ruling
was "fundamentally at odds with the strong public policy of the
United States." Therefore, the denial of comity was justified.3 6
III. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code
Until section 304 was enacted in 1978, a foreign representative
of a bankrupt estate could not commence proceedings in a United
States Bankruptcy Court;3 7 any deference granted by a United States
court to a foreign bankruptcy administration was based purely on
principles of comity.38 The 1974 insolvency of Bankhaus I.D. Her-
statt, one of West Germany's largest commercial banks, drew the
United States' attention to the inadequacies of its bankruptcy laws.3
9
In the Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt case, United States creditors and the
foreign trustee competed for control of the Bank's American assets
worth $150 million in what was called a "transatlantic juridical ca-
lamity."' 40 This situation, combined with the subsequent insolven-
cies of two other large multinational banks, 4 1 emphasized the
problems with U.S. bankruptcy laws and led to Congressional review
and the eventual enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and section
304.42
Section 304(a) and (b) authorize a foreign representative of a
bankrupt estate to commence a case in a United States Bankruptcy
Court ancillary to a foreign insolvency proceeding in order "to ad-
minister assets located in this country, to prevent dismemberment by
34 Id. at 632. The court stated that the Companies Court, which is better suited to
decide when and where the claim should be litigated, could determine whether to respect
the choice of forum clause. Id. Furthermore, the Companies Court is certainly competent
to construe the contract under District of Columbia law, as the contract provided, should
the need arise. Id.
35 Id at 633.
36 Id. at 633-34 (citations omitted). The administrators showed a "callous disregard
to the U.S. court system" that could not be ignored. Id. at 634.
37 Comment, 1988 Developments and the Conflicts Arising Under Section 304, 6 BANKR. DEV.
J. 345, 346-47 (1989) [hereinafter "Comment, Developments and Conflicts"].
38 Comment, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has It Fostered the Development of an
"International Bankruptcy System? ", 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541, 546 (1984)[hereinafter
"Comment, Section 304 of the Code"].
39 Comment, Developments and Conflicts, supra note 37, at 345-46; Unger, United States
Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L LAW. 1153, 1163-67 (1985).
40 Comment, Developments and Conflicts, supra note 37, at 345-46 (quoting Morale &
Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny
of Comity, 39 Bus. LAw. 1573, 1574 (1984)).
41 See In re Banque de Financement, S.A., 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Israel-
British Bank Ltd., 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
42 Comment, Developments and Conflicts, supra note 37, at 346. See also Unger, supra
note 39, at 1163-67.
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local creditors of assets located here, or for other appropriate re-
lief."' 43 Section 304(c) provides that in deciding whether to grant
relief, the court "shall be guided by what will best assure an econom-
ical and expeditious administration" of the estate and is consistent
with the following criteria:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against preju-
dice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such for-
eign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property
of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accord-
ance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start
for the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
44
The legislative history following the section notes that 304(c) is
modified to include considerations of comity "in addition to the
other factors" listed.45 Congress intended these criteria to be guide-
lines so that the court would have "maximum flexibility" to consider
"all of the circumstances of each case."'46
IV. Judicial Interpretation of Comity and Section 304
The United States Supreme Court decision of Hilton v. Guyot 47
set forth the basic principle of international comity48 relied upon by
courts in deciding section 304 issues.4 9 Hilton has been interpreted
to create a presumption of comity; 50 if a foreign court has jurisdic-
tion, and if it is consistent with the law and public policy of the forum
state to do so, then a domestic court should grant comity to the deci-
sions of the foreign court. 5' Moreover, the Hilton Court indicated
that reciprocity is a necessary prerequisite to the granting of
comity.5 2
Early decisions interpreting the section 304(c) criteria were usu-
43 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978).
44 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988).
45 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) (legislative statement).
46 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978). Principles of comity and respect
for the laws of other nations necessitate this flexibility. Id.
47 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
48 The Hilton Court stated that comity is neither an "absolute obligation" nor a
"mere courtesy." It is recognition by one nation of the "legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation" after considering both "international duty and convenience" and
"the rights of its own citizens." d. at 163-64.
49 See, e.g., Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs. Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621, 629 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
50 See Comment, Section 304 of the Code, supra note 38, at 557-58.
51 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202.
52 Id. at 288.
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ally consistent with the doctrine of pluralism, or territoriality,
whereby foreign bankruptcy proceedings would not be recognized,
and American assets would be distributed by United States laws with-
out regard to the foreign adjudication. 53 In re Toga Mfg. 54 illustrates
this extreme position of concern for the rights and claims of U.S.
creditors. The Toga court emphasized one section 304(c) factor in its
denial of a Canadian representative's petition for the turnover of as-
sets that had been garnished by a U.S. creditor. 55 Because the credi-
tor would not have received secured status under Canadian law, and
thus would not be treated "substantially in accordance" with the or-
der provided under United States law, the Toga court determined
that section 304(c)(4) was not satisfied.5 6 Although the court as-
serted that litigation in Canada would not inconvenience the credi-
tor, it qualified this assertion by stating that U.S. creditors' claims
"must be protected against foreign judgments inconsistent with this
country's well-defined and accepted policies."' 57 In addressing com-
ity, the court concluded from two nineteenth-century cases that
United States courts traditionally are adverse to claims of foreign
representatives. 58
Even those early decisions granting relief to a foreign represen-
tative were laden with conditions of protection for United States
creditors such that, though relief was technically granted, for all
practical purposes it was denied. The court in In re Lineas Areas de
Nicaragua, S.A. 59 granted such conditional relief to a foreign repre-
sentative seeking the transfer of the debtor's American assets and an
injunction against suits brought by U.S. creditors. 60 In granting the
foreign representative's section 304 request, the court imposed the
conditions that none of the American assets could be taken from the
country, and that these assets had to be applied to satisfy U.S. credi-
tors' claims first.6 1 United States creditors were enjoined from en-
forcing any judgments received against the debtor without the
bankruptcy court's assent; however, creditors were not enjoined
53 Wolonieki, Co-operation between National Courts in International Insolvencies: Recent
United Kingdom Legislation, 35 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 644, 644 (1986). In other words, protec-
tion of the United States creditor is paramount. For thorough explanations of this doc-
trine, see Huber, supra note 1, at 744-46, and Comment, Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v Salen
Reefer Serv. A.B., 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 911, 912-13 (1986).
54 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
55 See id. at 168-69.
56 Toga, 28 Bankr. at 168-69.
57 Id. at 170.
58 Id. at 167 (citing Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809) and Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (1827)).
59 10 Bankr. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
60 Id. at 791.
61 Id. This relief was of little value to the foreign representative since the claims of
U.S. creditors were greater than the value of the U.S. assets. In re Lineas Areas de Nicara-
gua, S.A., 13 Bankr. 779, 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
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from proceeding with pending litigation against the debtor to re-
ceive a judgment.62 In a later action by the foreign representative,
the bankruptcy court denied relief based primarily on section
304(c) (2), the inconvenience factor.63 The court found that forcing a
United States creditor to litigate its claim abroad was "to be avoided
if possible under section 304(c)(2)."64
The restrictions imposed in Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv., 65
similarly undermined the court's grant of relief to the foreign repre-
sentative. Cornfeld was a pre-Code decision, but it was based on sec-
tion 304, which was enacted but not yet effective, and on three of the
section 304(c) criteria in particular: international comity, the similar-
ities between Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy law, and the fair and
efficient distribution of assets.66 The court emphasized the impor-
tance of comity, but deferred to the foreign proceeding only if the
foreign representative waived any procedural defenses that would
bar the U.S. creditor from bringing a later action in a United States
court to remedy any inequities in the foreign proceeding.67 The
court deferred to the foreign proceeding under the guise of comity,
but only after retaining jurisdiction to enable better protection of
U.S. creditors' claims.
While the above-discussed cases manifest a territorial applica-
tion of the section 304(c) criteria where the court's primary concern
is for the protection of United States creditors, In re Culmer 6a is one
of the first decisions to emphasize comity in a move toward the
universality principle, whereby one bankruptcy proceeding is held in
the jurisdiction where the debtor is domiciled, and all other jurisdic-
tions defer to its decisions. 69 In granting the request of foreign rep-
resentatives to transfer American assets to the Bahamas, the Culmer
court completed a thorough application of the section 304(c) criteria
to the facts at issue.70 Although all factors were considered in ad-
dressing United States creditors' objections, the court clearly
stressed comity as the overriding basis for its decision. 71 The court
first suggested that section 304 was a codification of prior common
62 Lineas, 10 Bankr. at 791.
63 Lineas, 13 Bankr. at 780.
64 Id. This decision has been criticized. Since an American creditor will always expe-
rience some inconvenience when forced to participate in a foreign proceeding, courts
could never grant relief under this holding. Huber, supra note 1, at 751.
65 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
66 Id. at 1258-60.
67 Id. at 1262.
68 25 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
69 For thorough discussions of the universality theory, see James, International Bank-
ruptcy: Limited Recognition in the New U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 3 Hous. J. INT'L L. 241, 242 n.9
(1981); Woloniecki, supra note 53, at 644; Huber, supra note I at 744-46; Comment, supra
note 53, at 915-18.
70 Culmer, 25 Bankr. at 628-31.
71 See id. at 629-30.
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law principles of comity because all of the section 304(c) factors were
traditionally "within a court's determination whether to afford com-
ity to a [foreign proceeding]. ' '72 The court then narrowed the ex-
ceptions to the recognition of comity to only those cases where the
judicial enforcement of such claims would approve a transaction "in-
herently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing
moral sense." 73
In a 1988 decision deferring to the request of a foreign repre-
sentative, the court in In re Axona International Credit 74 also viewed
section 304 as a codification of common law principles of comity. 75
The Axona court adopted the narrow exceptions to comity set forth in
Culmer.76 Directly adverse to the protectionist Toga decision, the Ax-
ona court found that the loss of a United States creditor's secured
status when forced to participate in a foreign proceeding is a minor
difference in the laws of the two jurisdictions, and thus, did not jus-
tify the denial of comity. 77 The Axona court stated that Toga was in-
consistent with "the modern need for flexibility in the construction
of comity." s7 8 Other than the court's finding that section 304(c)(4)
was not violated, Axona focused primarily on the comity factor.79
V. The Gercke Analysis: Relation to Prior Section 304 Decisions
At first glance, the relative quantity of the Gercke court's discus-
sion of the comity element of section 304(c)80 suggests that the deci-
sion is consistent with the extremist trend furthered by Culmer and
Axona. 8 1 However, the Gercke court's deliberate analysis of all rele-
vant section 304(c) factors and the protection that the court does
afford the United States creditor indicate that it is rather a cautious
retreat from these decisions. First of all, the Gercke court does not
adopt the narrow standard created in Axona for dete-mining excep-
tions to the granting of comity. 82 Gercke recognizes only the tradi-
tional and more conservative principle set forth in Hilton that comity
72 Culmer, 25 Bankr. at 629.
73 Id.(quoting Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13, 254
N.Y.S.2d 527, 529, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1964)).
74 88 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). Relief was granted in Axona pursuant to
section 305(b), but this section incorporates the same criterion as section 304(c).
75 Id. at 608.
76 Id. at 609.
77 See id. at 610.
78 Axona, 88 Bankr. at 611. But see In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 Bankr. 584
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988)(holding that all section 304(c) factors should be given equal
consideration).
79 Axona, 88 Bankr. at 611.
80 Gerche, 122 Bankr. at 628-34. The court devotes approximately four pages to its
discussion of section 304(c)(5), whereas the other factors received no more than one page
each. Id.
81 See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
82 See Gercke, 122 Bankr. at 631-32.
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is generally granted unless the foreign court is not of competent ju-
risdiction or unless to do so would prejudice the rights of U.S. credi-
tors or violate domestic public policy.8 3 Of course, since under the
facts the Gercke court found no exception to the comity doctrine as
delineated by Hilton, it had no reason to even consider the new stan-
dard, since it reached the same result as had it adopted the Culmer
approach.
Secondly, the Gercke decision does not assert, nor even imply, its
acceptance of the Culmer and Axona interpretation of section 304(c) as
the codification of comity. 84 Although the court's analysis of the rel-
evant section 304(c) factors other than comity is included in the prior
irreparable harm discussion,8 5 these factors are not treated as com-
ponents of comity. Instead, the court addresses the merits of each
factor distinct from its relationship to the issue of comity.
The mistaken impression that Gercke interprets section 304 as
comity codified could be the result of the court's inappropriate reli-
ance on Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Serv. A.B.8 6 in its ex-
amination of the comity criterion. In Cunard, an English creditor
attempted to attach a Scandinavian debtor's assets in the possession
of an American garnishee of the debtor.8 7 The foreign representa-
tive's request to vacate the order of attachment was granted.8 8
Although the Gercke court cited to Cunard only with respect to general
definitions of comity and public policy violations sufficient to consti-
tute an exception to comity,8 9 Cunard remains of little relevance be-
cause it can be distinguished on several points. First, Cunard was not
an ancillary proceeding in a bankruptcy court under section 304; the
district court in Cunard, which did not need to address the section
304(c) criteria, based its decision on general principles of comity.90
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that section
304 was not an exclusive remedy. 9' Second, unlike Gercke, the Cunard
court did not need to consider the protection of United States credi-
tors because there were none. 92 Finally, as Gercke conceded, the
Cunard court vacated an order for the attachment of the debtor's as-
sets, an act "clearly threatening the policy of equality of treatment of
83 Gerche, 122 Bankr. at 631.
84 See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
85 Gercke, 122 Bankr. at 629. The question of economic and expeditious administra-
tion of the estate is "answered by the analysis of irreparable harm." Id.
86 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
87 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv., A.B., 49 Bankr. 614, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
88 Id. at 619.
89 Gercke, 122 Bankr. at 631.
90 Cunard, 773 F.2d at 456.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 454-56. The court of appeals asserted that Congress did not intend section
304 to replace the use of general principles of comity as a remedy in international bank-
ruptcies. d. at 456.
666 [VOL. 16
BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 304
creditors"; 93 whereas, Gercke enjoined an action that would result
merely in an entry of judgment against the debtor, but would not
necessarily affect the equal treatment of creditors.
VI. The Gercke Analysis of the Section 304(c) Comity Factor
In its analysis of section 304(c) (5), the Gercke court appropriately
rejected York's argument that the lack of reciprocity should justify
the denial of comity.9 4 Gercke reasoned that since the evidence
presented by the parties was "less than conclusive that a United
Kingdom court would refuse to accord comity to United States bank-
ruptcy proceedings in equivalent circumstances," relief would not be
withheld on this basis.95
Although the Gercke court's conclusion is consistent with prece-
dent, its method of reasoning may be flawed. When the United
States Supreme Court in Hilton set forth the general principle of
comity and when it should be afforded, the Court made application
of the doctrine specifically conditioned on the presence of reciproc-
ity.96 Now, however, it is clear that using reciprocity in this restric-
tive manner is adverse to the purpose behind the enactment of
section 304. 9 7 If Congress intended to promote the fair and orderly
distribution of assets, conditioning relief on reciprocity would under-
mine the utility of a section 304 ancillary proceeding to a foreign
representative.9 8 The Cunard holding that "proof of reciprocity is
not essential for the granting of comity"9 9 is representative of the
modern approach. 00 Since it is well established that reciprocity is
no longer a requirement for granting comity in international bank-
ruptcies, whether or not the Gercke parties' proof of reciprocity is
conclusive is irrelevant for purposes of section 304(c)(5). Even if it
was clear that the United Kingdom would not reciprocate, the Gercke
court still could have found the comity factor of section 304 to be in
Dominion's favor. Since the court need not consider reciprocity
under section 304(c)(5), York's argument may have been stronger
had it been framed in the context of section 304(c)(2) protection of
the U.S. creditors from prejudice in the foreign proceeding or sec-
tion 304(c) (4) distribution of assets in accordance with the order pre-
93 Gercke, 122 Bankr. at 632 n.6.
94 Id. at 633.
95 Id.
96 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 210. In fact, the Court denied recognition of the foreign judg-
ment at issue under the principle of comity because of the "want of reciprocity" on the
part of the foreign country to give effect to U.S. judgments. Id.
97 See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
98 See also Huber, supra note 1, at 759-60; Comment, Section 304 of the Code, supra note
38, at 556-57.
99 Cunard, 773 F.2d at 460.
100 See Morales & Deutsch, supra note 40, at 1576 n.10.
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scribed by the Code.' 0 '
The second issue the court addressed in its analysis of section
304(c)(5), York's claim that comity should not be granted due to the
choice of forum clause in the Dominion-York contract providing for
the settlement of all disputes under the courts of the District of Co-
lumbia, could also have been addressed (and to a limited extent it
was) under section 304(c)(2) to protect York from prejudice.' 0 2 The
characterization of this as a comity issue follows from the Gercke
court's reliance upon the Cornfeld decision.'10 3 However, it can be
argued that the distinctions between the two cases render this reli-
ance inappropriate.
First of all, the Cornfeld court had an equitable motive for requir-
ing the creditor to seek relief in Canada rather than in the United
States: the creditor in Cornfeld was a founder and director of the Ca-
nadian debtor corporation, had allegedly committed wrongful acts
thereby breaching his corporate duties to the debtor, and was trying
to sue the corporation for indemnity. 10 4 Secondly, in granting com-
ity despite a forum selection clause in the director's contract
designating New York as the appropriate jurisdiction, the Cornfeld
court emphasized that Canada's proximity and procedural safe-
guards similar to those of the U.S. entitled it to special treatment. 10 5
Finally, the Cornfeld court clearly adopted Culmer's narrow definition
of exceptions to the extension of comity, 10 6 while Gercke seems to
have retained Hilton's more expansive view.' 0 7
In light of these distinctions, it is unfortunate that the Gercke
court gave little attention to the arguments in favor of enforcing fo-
rum selection clauses.' 0 8 Although it is true that anyone who deals
with a foreign corporation "impliedly subjects himself to such laws of
the foreign government, affecting the.., corporation with which he
voluntarily contracts, as the . . . policy of that government autho-
rizes," 10 9 there are valid reasons to recognize the contractual choice
of forum." 0 By consistently preserving the integrity of such clauses,
U.S. courts will further predictability and efficiency in international
commercial business and can more adequately protect the interests
of both creditors and debtors.' Furthermore, U.S. creditors who
101 However, in Gercke, York stipulated to section 304(c)(4), that the U.K. Insolvency
Act is substantially in accord with the Code on the order of distribution of assets.
102 Gercke, 122 Bankr. at 629-33.
los Id. at 631.
104 Comfeld, 471 F. Supp. at 1255-57.
105 Id. at 1259.
106 Id.
107 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
108 See Gercke, 122 Bankr. at 632.
109 Gercke, 122 Bankr. 631 (citing Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527,
537 (1883)).
1o See Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 40, at 1573, 1583, 1596-97.
111 Id.
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are assured of the protection of a choice of forum clause can extend
such credit to foreign debtors at lower costs and with fewer
restrictions. 112
VlI. Conclusion: Status of the Section 304(c) Comity Factor after
Gercke
The Gercke decision is a conservative retreat from cases such as
Culmer and Axona, which exemplify the trend toward interpreting sec-
tion 304(c) as the codification of comity. 113 Despite inconsistencies
within the court's reasoning, the Gercke decision's careful treatment
of the relevant section 304(c) factors indicates that it is perhaps more
in line with legislative intent than are Culmer and Axona. In modifying
section 304(c) to include the comity factor, Congress noted that it
should be considered "in addition to the other factors specified
therein." ' "14 The fact that comity was added as a separate criterion
indicates that section 304(c) could not logically be considered the
codification of comity that Culmer and Axona suggest.
The Gercke court deferred to the foreign proceeding in enjoining
York's further litigation, but unlike Culmer and Axona, the Gercke court
did not do so without affording the creditor some protection.
Gercke's enforcement of the discovery order is an improvement on
the protection provided to the U.S. creditors in Cornfeld and Lin-
eas. 15 Requiring Dominion to comply with the discovery order ade-
quately protected York's interests but did not undermine the court's
extension of comity with respect to further litigation of the claim.
However, Gercke's misguided reliance on Cunard and Cornfeld,
distinguishable cases with limited relevance, resulted in the court's
disregard for the choice of forum clause in the Dominion-York con-
tract."t 6 The court gave little consideration to the impact that subor-
dinating the integrity of these clauses to principles of comity will
have on the American business sector's desire and ability to enter
into international commercial agreements.
By using the section 304 factors as guidelines to balance the in-
terest of the foreign representative in achieving a fair and efficient
administration of the estate against the interest of the domestic cred-
itor in protecting his rights and claims against prejudice in the for-
112 Id. Credit is especially important to third world nations which could not build a
"stable industrial economic base" without the "increased influx of American money and
technology." Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 40, at 1595. Of course, York did not extend
credit to Dominion. Rather, it asserted a breach of contract claim against the debtor cor-
poration. Since this "cost of credit" argument is inapplicable to the situation in Gercke,
future courts should limit the relevance of this decision to its facts.
113 See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
114 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988) (legislative statement).
115 See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
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eign proceeding, 117 Gercke has taken a correct, middle-of-the-road
approach to applying section 304(c) consistent with legislative in-
tent.'18 With the exception of its determination of the choice of
forum clause issue, Gercke is a fair and accurate application of section
304(c). Future cases consistent with Gercke will further the achieve-
ment of a realistic and practical blend of universality and territorial-
ity in United States bankruptcy law.
ELIZABETH G. PALMER
117 See supra notes 20-36 and accompanying text.
118 For a detailed analysis of the legislative history behind the enactment of section
304, see Morales & Deutsch, supra note 40, at 1586-88. See also Given & Vilaplana, Comity
Revisited: Multinational Bankruptcy Cases under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 325, 328-29. The language of section 304 is meant to represent a "shift from a
parochial view of bankruptcy" to greater recognition of the bankruptcy laws of other na-
tions. Given & Vilaplana, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 328. Section 304 is a "middle path" be-
tween the concepts of territoriality and universality. Id. at 329.
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